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Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004. 227 pp. (+xi) ISBN 0801488621 (paper).

Reviewed by Dorian Stuber
Haverford College
Teresa Brennan's last work, The Transmission of Affect, is as ambitious as it
is wide-ranging. Brennan here seeks nothing less than a new understanding
of the relation between body and signification -- a relation that hinges on her
particular definition of affect.
In elaborating this definition, Brennan weighs in on a concept of increasing
interest to many in the humanities. Affect has seemed a way to supplement
poststructuralism's persuasive but perhaps over-emphatic insistence on the
preeminence of language and/or discourse. (Note that this interest in the
extra-discursive extends to poststructuralism's most prominent practitioners;
consider, for example, Derrida's insistence that the readability of a tear or a
cry is not the same as the readability of a text.[1] ) But until now this interest
has lacked systematizing force, so that affect has threatened to become an illdefined value, an empty term of the sort that Lacan called intellectual
mouthwash.
Brennan goes some distance toward alleviating this threat. Her book offers a
clear, even rigorous definition of affect. The most compelling -- and
contentious -- result of that definition is the theory of language it generates.
Although Brennan has no interest in immediately or necessarily privileging
language over any other form of manifestation or expression, she also does
not oppose language to corporeal expression. Indeed, the eventual tendency
of her argument is to exhort another language, which she calls a "language of
the flesh."
Brennan is well-versed in deconstruction, poststructuralism, and Lacanian
psychoanalysis, but she finds each of these methodologies insufficient
because they are unable to accept their own conclusions. The decentered
subject, says Brennan, need not necessitate the evacuation of meaning tout
court. Indeed, real meaning is available only once we abandon the idea of the
human subject qua ostensibly impervious and self-sufficient ego. Meaning is
all around us, in the interlocking systems that make up what Brennan
reluctantly calls "the life drive." Reluctantly, because this is too
homogenizing a term for the "interweaving logical chains that are selfreferential and exist independently of the subject, but which sustain the life
of the subject's kind through their interaction" (146). The life drive exceeds
any individual subject, and will always "choose" a species over an
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individual. (The ego, says Brennan, thus opposes the life drive.) But,
however differentiated, the life drive often appears in her text as a synonym
for energy. Indeed, the tendency of her work as a whole has been to put the
insights of psychoanalysis and Marxism in service of a theory of what she
has elsewhere called "energetics": "the study of the energetic and affective
connections between an individual, other people and the surrounding
environment." [2]
The first chapter of The Transmission of Affect outlines the theory of affect
that is then elaborated in the rest of the book. This theory is difficult -- but
valuable -- enough to merit sustained explication. The argument begins from
Brennan's belief that our habitual experience of the relation between body
and language is one of opposition. The reason for this unfortunate nonalignment is the prevalence of negative affects; their overwhelming and
distorting presence undermines our well-being. Brennan argues that to
realign them we need, first, to become alert to the "other I" that has been
overshadowed by the ego and that forms "an alternative center for coherence
in the mind" (118); second, to attend to life as such rather than individual
life; and, third, to value and promulgate a science of systems over a science
of the individual.
It will be clear that affect, for Brennan, is a negative force. But what is it
exactly? In dialectical fashion, it is most easily understood in opposition to
what it is not. Specifically, affect is not feeling. Feelings, she says, offer a
unified interpretation of particular sensory information: feelings are
sensations that have found a match in words. Feelings are thus expressive in
the fullest sense of the term; their function is one of discernment. Feelings
are thoughtful, while affects are thoughtless. Ultimately, Brennan wants to
release feeling from affect, so that sensation and word might become
attuned.
Affect, then, despite occasional equivocations on Brennan's part, is an
evaluative rather than a descriptive term. Brennan allows that affects can
serve to protect the individual from imminent harm. They do so by helping to
compose the self or ego as such. (Brennan defines the ego as the affects in a
more solid or sedimented constellation.) But more often, especially in
contemporary Western society, affects effect immanent harm. They do so by
fooling us into thinking that the ego is something more than a useful fiction,
something equivalent to being alive, when in fact it is the opposite of the life
drive. The experience of affect is a restrictive, ultimately punitive
experience. It is significant that the first reference to affect in the text is to
"grief, anxiety, or anger" (1). The more we read, the more these seem
the only affects. Joy, it seems, it something else entirely. It is a version of the
love or "living attention" that the body can experience only in the absence of
affect.
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Modern consciousness, which is to say consciousness under the sway of "the
physical toxicity and stress of daily life in the West" (22), ignores, even
suppresses, the knowledge granted by feeling. With that knowledge comes
the possibility of expression, for feeling is "structured like a language and
functions in an analogous way" (23). To emphasize the expressive, precise
quality of this feeling, Brennan sometimes calls it "finer feeling." Such
feeling communicates the living attunement of the body that Brennan
variously calls "fleshly intelligence," "fleshly codes," or a "language of the
flesh."
Affects, by contrast, are overwhelming emotions (and moods and sentiments
are "subsets referring to longer-lasting affective constellations" [6]). The
most salient thing about affects, for Brennan, is that they are able to be
transmitted -- indeed, they are necessarily transmitted. An affect is always
experienced in a social situation (even if it is experienced differently from
person to person). The book's title thus refers not to the transmission of this
or that affect, considered as an entity or experience that might or might not
be transmitted, but rather to the transmission that all affect necessarily is.
The moment of affect's transmission is a moment of judgment; this judgment
relates to the projection or introjection of energy. Thus Brennan's definition
of affect as "the physiological shift accompanying a judgment" (5). Affects
are always material and composed of an energetic dimension. This means,
says Brennan, that "we are not self-contained in terms of our energies" (6).
The idea of transmitted affects thus "undermines the dichotomy between the
individual and the environment and the related opposition between the
biological and the social" (7). According to Brennan, when we enter a room
and unmistakably "feel the atmosphere" (of rank fear, for example), our
experience is an instance of the transmission of affect. Significantly, such
transmission happens not through sight but through smell. What we respond
to is not anything we see (like body language) but rather something that we
smell without even knowing it (this is called "unconscious olfaction").
Brennan theorizes a transfiguration more immediate than that of mimesis.
For to restrict our thinking to visual clues is to protect our false idea of
ourselves as self-contained. Taking a term from neuroscience, "entrainment,"
Brennan argues that the transmission of affect is a way of entraining or
bringing into alignment our nervous and hormonal systems with those of
others. The moods of others affect our own, which is to say they affect our
very physiology, at the unconscious level of hormones and pheromones.
When we enter an anxiety-laden room, for example, we perceive that fear by
smelling it, which leads us to breathe more quickly, to sweat, to clench our
hands, and to react emotionally to those changes. Of course, that emotional
reaction depends on who we are, and on our own personal histories. We
might be inclined to accept this fear as a kind of hostility directed at us, and
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become anxious or depressed. Or we might be inclined to direct the fear
against someone else, and become aggressive or hostile.
At a time when behavior is increasingly thought to be genetically
determined, Brennan insists that affect originates in the social, and that the
social conditions the biological. What is often dismissively called
"atmosphere" or "environment"' is for Brennan a force that gets inside us and
influences our very bodily workings. Affects can enhance us, when we
project them out on to others, or they can deplete us, when we introject them.
But that enhancement can only ever be temporary, for ultimately such
projection is a contemptible psychic "dumping," a nefarious judgment in
which we fob off our own emotions on another, by ascribing them, rather
than ourselves, to be the source of negativity. Judgment, as Brennan
describes it, is the opposite of discernment. When we judge, we are
possessed by affect. When we discern, we detach ourselves from affect: we
experience insight, the process by which sensation and the expression of
sensation connect. When we discern we are self-possessed, rather than selfcontained. By contrast, when we are self-contained we are imprisoned in that
calcified mass of affect called the ego, a state we can only maintain by
continuing to project or transmit bad affects onto others, thus sealing
ourselves off from any kinship with those others.
Transmission is thus the central element of Brennan's theory of affects.
Although she is indebted to psychoanalysis as the modern methodology most
attentive to the corporeal materiality of affects, her own theory diverges from
Freud's metapsychology "in that it postulates an origin for affects that is
independent of the individual experiencing them" (13). Hell, for Brennan,
isn't other people. Rather, it's the self, considered as a self-contained subject
defined against those others. For to think that, affectively speaking, we are
individuals, such that our affects seem "our own," is to suffer from a fantasy.
Indeed, for Brennan, this foundational fantasy governs Western modernity. It
is experienced, in miniature, in the infant's projection of its passivity and
helplessness on to the mother. The foundational fantasy is "the belief that
'we,' the passive infant, are the true fountain of energy, and the mother is a
hapless, witless receptacle" (13).
For Brennan, the primary effect of this fantasy, in allowing for a subjectcentered, self-interested point of view, is to denigrate the idea that the flesh
is itself intelligent. In denying the corporeal "other I" that lies behind the
ego, the Western subject denies the transmission of affect that nonetheless
remains (destructively) operative. Projection/introjection is delusional
inasmuch as it is not experienced as a transmission. The deluded subject
thinks, for instance, that the other is bad and it itself is good; it fails to see
that the rage and envy it attributes to the other is really its own.
Brennan's definition of fantasy -- "a mental activity that allows us to alter an
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unpleasant reality by making it into something more pleasurable" (12) -- is
psychoanalytic, but it shares none of the ambivalence that the term holds for
psychoanalysis. For Brennan, fantasy is only ever an instrument of selfdeception and false consciousness. She has no sense that fantasy might be a
useful, productive, or generative function. (Brennan, we might say, hews
more to Klein than to Winnicott.) One reason for this narrow understanding
of fantasy is that Brennan understands psychic operations in world historical
terms -- fantasy, for Brennan, is the Western fantasy of self-sufficiency, selfmastery, and, indeed, of self or ego that only began to take its current allencompassing form in the eighteenth century. Although the judgmental
transmission of affect is modeled by the exchange between infant and
mother, it functions just as importantly at the level of cultural history. [3]
Having set forth in Chapter One this intricate theoretical definition of affect
and its relation to fantasy, Brennan proceeds in the rest of her book to
examine the transmission of affect in various social, physiological, and
intellectual environments. In Chapter Two, she considers the relation
between clinical analysis and the transmission of affect, arguing that
psychoanalysis, too beholden to the notion that "the healthy person is a selfcontained person" (24), has only fleetingly paid attention to transmission. Its
most sustained thinking about transmission lies in the concepts of
transference and counter-transference, but even these are usually considered
as a repetition of the subject's concerns rather than as transmission properly
speaking. Brennan upholds the (quite different) theories of Wilfred Bion and
Jean Laplanche as moments that contest and critique the dominant tendency
of analysis to shortchange transmission. In Chapter Three, Brennan examines
the way affect can be transmitted -- and resisted -- within crowds. Here she
takes on a century's worth of changing psychological and sociological
research on crowd theory, paying particular attention to recent work in the
field of endocrinology on hormonal interaction and olfactory entrainment.
This biological interest continues in Chapter Four, in which Brennan
discusses affect's transmission between mother and fetus. She argues that
contemporary scientific evidence suggesting that the mother is actively, not
passively, related to the fetus must be brought to bear on the way we
understand the mother's relation to the child after birth. (This is a way of
contesting the passive position to which the mother is relegated in the
foundational fantasy.) For Brennan, the "living logic" of the mother's flesh
shields the fetus from negative affects. Such "living logic," in the form of
attention and love, ought, Brennan argues, to govern all our interactions. In
Chapter Five, Brennan moves from the physiological to the cultural, by
relating affects to the pre-modern, Judeo-Christian categories of demons and
deadly sins. To understand affects as sins, "capable of moving from one
person to another, is to do no more than to describe the transmission of affect
in more anthropomorphic vocabulary" (115). This vocabulary interests
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Brennan inasmuch as it might prove useful in combating affect's deadening
tendencies.
It is perhaps by now clear that the ultimate thrust of her text is more than
merely diagnostic. It is hortatory, evaluative, even prescriptive. She wants to
do more than to describe what affects are and what they make us do. She
wants to incite us to change ourselves by changing our relation to those
affects, specifically by allowing us to resist their gross thoughtlessness. To
resist affect, says Brennan, is to transform it.
In the book's final two chapters, Brennan suggests how that transformation
might occur, through what she calls the education of the senses. That
education turns on the possibility of relating experience to language in ever
more refined ways -- a possibility that requires that we expand our definition
of language to include the systems of the body. At stake is the body's very
interpretability in language.
Here, too, Brennan is openly indebted to psychoanalysis. The fundamental
premise of clinical practice is that we experience release -- and relief -- when
we put words to our bodily experiences, that is to say, our symptoms.
Brennan is not suggesting that we should replace corporeal expression with
language, but rather that we should (re)align those modes of expression. That
alignment requires discernment. As we have seen, discernment is the
meditative process whereby the body's experiences can be named: "insofar as
people attend actively, listen to what they are feeling, they can identify
sensations, sounds, and images, that they can name or, after struggle, can
find words for. We do this all the time. It is called thinking" (140). As
always Brennan is here bracing in her directness -- and her refusal to
separate intelligence and body. Brennan never opposes these qualities, just as
she never opposes meditation and reason. (Her use of "meditation" thus
recalls its use by Descartes in his Meditations.)
But Brennan is vague when it comes to explaining this alignment of
corporeal with linguistic expression. What does "alignment" mean? How
does it happen? Brennan follows Lacan in suggesting that language is an
entity greater than any individual who uses it. It preexists her, and continues
after her death. The structure of language and the structure of the individual
are thus at cross purposes: language is eternal and infinite, whereas human
life is temporal and finite. Brennan then equates this structure to the ego's
relation to the greater processes of life of which it is only an insignificant
part. Life itself -- which is expressed directly through those "languages" or
forms of expression that Brennan variously calls "fleshly intelligence" or
"fleshly codes" or "languages of the flesh"-- is infinite in the same way as
grammatical language, and it is only the deluded, affect-laden perspective of
the ego that fails to see this, by overstating its own importance. For Brennan,
the only difference between corporeal and linguistic languages is that the
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latter is "slower" than the former, because it incorporates self-consciousness
of its own expressive capacities into its operation. The languages of the flesh,
by contrast, are quick, almost instantaneous. (This description continues the
book's disturbing equation of whatever is gross, unrefined and slow with
whatever is harmful or bad.)
The senses -- particularly those senses that the West has devalued as
vegetative or base, senses like smell and taste -- are attuned with the larger
living logic. Our problem, says Brennan, is that the information they transmit
"is interpreted or transliterated by something split from the senses" (137).
This "something" is the language-wielding individual, which ought, for
Brennan, to interpret in harmony or alignment with that living logic rather
than in opposition to it. Brennan argues for the sundered unity of corporeal
and linguistic languages inductively, by our experience of constriction when
our feeling or problem remains nameless and our experience of release when
"a hitherto nameless feeling succeeds in identifying itself" (149).
The passive construction in this last formulation gets to the heart of the
matter. For although Brennan understands both linguistic and corporeal
languages to exceed the individual, she also attributes tremendous power to
the individual, who can transform language through learning, attention, and
reasoning. (Her book concludes, in a version of Wittgenstein's aphorism, "Of
that we cannot speak, thereof we must learn" [164].) This confusion over
individual power or agency is not cleared up by referring, as Brennan
repeatedly does, to an "other I" that must replace the position of the ego. The
"other I" is by definition attuned to the "living logic" of the flesh -- but what
is the status of this "attunement"? How do we find the words to express this
dispersal of agency? Is this an active process or a passive one? Brennan
occasionally hints that the body itself, as a sensing being, may operate on our
linguistic choices: "Language may echo the facts of transmission; sentir may
mean smell [in French] either because we once knew that we felt the other's
feelings by smell or because the body knows it still and seeks the word that
will best describe its operations" (149). The verbs here, "echoing" and
"knowing," seem to describe opposite sorts of activities. The passivity of
echoing is at odds with the activity of knowing.
Ultimately, it seems that Brennan would disagree with D. H. Lawrence's
often cited contention that "we have no language for the feelings." [4] For
Brennan, feelings are a kind of language that we can learn to speak -- or
learn again, for we have been speaking it all along. But Brennan might agree
with Lawrence's further insistence that we need another, perhaps
surreptitious, way of getting at the feeling buried in our everyday language.
And here, indeed, I think the writer Lawrence takes the lead over the theorist
Brennan, in that the former offers a sustained treatment of how linguistic
language might accommodate a valuable corporeal other. (Lawrence is
simply more explicit about what all writers to some extent do.) In Brennan's
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account, language -- no matter whether it be of the word or of the flesh -- is
straightforwardly communicative. There seems to be no place for the
waywardness of figural or rhetorical language -- even as she herself is
beholden to it. Where does such language fit in Brennan's opposition of two
kinds of signification? Why doesn't she consider figural language when she
uses such central, yet unexamined, concepts as "alignment" or "attunement"?
For are such terms not in some way metaphorical?
Any book that references fields as disparate as psychology, sociology,
intellectual history, religious studies, psychoneuroendocrinology and
developmental physiology is asking a lot of its readers. It must be said that
the middle chapters of The Transmission of Affect make for difficult reading.
The daunted reader, struggling with scientific research on hormones and
sociological studies of crowd behavior, may well wonder just what sort of
formidable polymath the book is aimed at. Alternatively, those with
specialized knowledge in any of these fields may well find fault with
Brennan's explications and conclusions. (I don't have the expertise to say.)
These various difficulties do not, however, invalidate the book's appeal.
Ambitious and innovative works of synthesis have a power that remains
undiminished by whatever faults specialists might find in them. The Birth of
Tragedy, for example, is no less valuable for being an unreliable guide to the
historical particulars of Greek drama. [5] The same is true of The
Transmission of Affect. Brennan claims that her work on pheromones and
hormones, for example, though clearly buttressed by much reading in highly
specialized literature, is intended "to illustrate a philosophical thesis" (112).
She adds, repeatedly, that her book is intended only to begin a conversation,
the further development or fulfillment of which must be a collective
endeavor. Yet even if we find Brennan's work difficult -- a reminder of all
that we do not know, and, too often, are content not to know -- we would do
well neither to dismiss it as hopelessly vague nor to lend much credence to
its author's modesty. Indeed, a comparison to The Birth of Tragedy is not
unwarranted. Like Nietzsche's, Brennan's book is most vital as a contribution
to -- properly speaking, a meditation on -- the theoretical or philosophical
question of the relation between living being and representation.
The theorization of this relation in terms of a possible, even eventual,
reconciliation is quite breathtaking. The audacious scope of The
Transmission of Affect is at once exhilarating and frustrating. For the book's
intellectual fearlessness rests on a series of repeatedly invoked moral
oppositions. Everything that is bad is matched by a corresponding and
countervailing good -- not affect but feeling, not judgment but discernment,
not self-containment but self-possession, not consciousness but awareness,
not ego but "other I" or soul. The problem here is not that the substance of
this "other I" -- to which all the other positive criterion contribute -- is
deferred pending further research. The problem is rather the vagueness with
which the good overcomes the bad. We should be grateful to Brennan for
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making us attentive to the languages of the body, but we still need further
consideration of the way that language as we have traditionally understood it
relates to those other, still potentially metaphorical languages. In particular,
we have not yet said all there is to say about the function of metaphor,
metonymy and all the other rhetorical resources of figurative language as
privileged elements in the task of aligning body and word.
Alas, we will need to continue this project without Brennan's guidance. The
untimeliness of her death -- she was struck by a car as she was crossing a
street, just as she had almost finished editing the manuscript -- is felt all the
more keenly in light of the timeliness of her work's subject matter. But to
remain true to the spirit of her inquiry we might recall her claim that one
speaks one's truth from one's place in a system, not from one's place as an
individual. In this way, The Transmission of Affect disavows its occasional
exhaustive tendencies, and becomes instead part of the larger, living,
attentive project it so compellingly enjoins.
Notes
1. Derrida, "Passages-from Traumatism to Promise," in Points…
Interviews, 1974-1994. Trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. (Stanford: Stanford UP,
1995).
2. Brennan, Exhausting Modernity: Grounds for a New Economy (London:
Routledge, 2000): 10.
3. Brennan has developed this historical reading more fully in Exhausting
Modernity. There she says that the fantasy in which the infant thinks the
mother waits upon it, rather than it upon the mother, is the same one that is
catered to by the commodity fetish of capitalism.
4. Lawrence, "The Novel and the Feelings" in Study of Thomas Hardy and
Other Essays, ed. Bruce Steele (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985): 203.
5. Joseph Frank makes this point in "A Hero of his Time," The New
Republic(Vol. 232 No. 4706 & 4707 28 March & 4 April 2005): 26-32.
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